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Lawrence J. Hayes*
T HIS ARTICLE DEALS with certain civil liabilities created by the
Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 in connection with the sale of securities. It is centered on
liability occasioned by misstatements or omissions in sales of
securities.
To place this particular subject in proper focus, it seems
necessary to first review generally some of the statutory bases
for liability. These statutory liabilities are in addition to what-
ever liabilities may exist at common law, or by virtue of state
statutory enactments.3 Thus the lawyer reviewing a particular
set of facts in contemplation of the rights of his client should
envision that if it is determined that a complaint should be filed,
that complaint will likely sound in a number of counts of both
common law and statutory derivation (subject, however, to the
requirement of security for costs considered subsequently).
Liability Under Section 11
Section 11 of the 1933 Act (as amended) creates a basis for
civil liability where there is a registration statement filed with
the S. E. C. which contains an untrue statement of a material
fact, or omits the statement of a material fact required to be
included, or omits a material fact necessary to make statements
which are contained in the registration statement or in the pros-
pectus not misleading.4
It is important to note that under Section 11 the right to
sue is not limited to the original purchaser but inures to any
person who innocently acquires the securities. This "innocence"
does not exist if the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission.
* Of the St. Paul, Minn. law firm of Maun, Hazel, Green, Hayes, Simon
& Aretz; member of the Minnesota and Illinois Bars.
1 15 U. S. C., Sec. 77a, et seq.
2 15 U. S. C., Sec. 78a, et seq.
3 Sec. 16, Securities Act of 1933; Sec. 28(a), Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See, for a general comparison of state and federal regulation, 2
Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, c. 34 (1959).
4 A small offering filed pursuant to Sec. 3 of the 1933 Act under Regulation
A (generally, in an amount not exceeding $300,000) is an exempt offering
and such a filing is not a "registration."
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Section 11 does not require the plaintiff to tender his stock.
That is, the remedy is not limited to rescission. By its very terms
Section 11 includes an action for damages.
The parties defendant in a suit under Section 11 for defects
in the registration statement include the issuer, the persons who
signed the registration statement, the directors, partners (if any),
experts and underwriters. The securities dealer is not a proper
party defendant under this section whereas a controlling person
under Section 15 is.5 The underwriter's liability is limited to
the total price at which the securities written by him and dis-
tributed to the public were offered to the public, unless the
underwriter received preferential treatment from the issuer.
In the instance of a cause of action based upon Section 11,
any party defendant except the issuer may avoid liability by
proving any one of the following defenses:
1. That he had effectively resigned before the effective date
of registration and notice.6
2. That he did not know that the registration statement had
become effective and that upon becoming aware of the fact he
notified the S. E. C. in writing to that effect, took the action re-
quired by Section 11 (b) (1) and gave reasonable public notice
that the registration statement had in fact become effective with-
out his knowledge.7
3. That generally he had reasonable ground for belief and
actually did believe in the truth and accuracy of the statements
contained in the registration statement.8
Any defendant in a Section 11 action is entitled thereunder
to reduce damages by proving that the depreciation in value
claimed resulted from some cause other than the claimed defect
in the registration statement.9
5 Sec. 15 of the 1933 Act creates a liability in the controlling person if he
controls a person otherwise liable under Sec. 11 or Sec. 12 of the Act.
It is a defense to such controlling person that he had no knowledge or
reasonable ground of belief as to the existence of facts by reason of which
the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
6 Sec. 11(b)(1), supra n. 1.
7 Sec. 11(b)(2), supra n. 1.
8 Sec. 11(b) (3). This subsection makes important distinctions between
those portions of the registration statement which are general representa-
tions, those made on the basis of expert opinion, and those purporting to
be based on public documents.
9 Sec. 11(e), supra n. 1.
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There has been very little precedent as to Section 11 actions,
possibly by reason of the standards maintained by the S. E. C.
itself to assure full disclosure in a registration statement.
Liability Under Section 12(1)
Section 12 of the 1933 Act has much broader scope than
Section 11. It is not limited to securities sold pursuant to regis-
tration with the S. E. C. On the other hand, liability under
Section 12 by its terms exists only in favor of the person who
actually purchases the security in the first instance, whereas, as
indicated earlier, liability under Section 11 exists as to subse-
quent purchasers.
Section 12 (1) provides generally that any person who offers
or sells a security in violation of Section 5 of the Act may sue
for damages or rescission. Section 5 makes it unlawful to sell
securities through the instruments of commerce when a required
registration statement is not in effect, or to sell securities without
observance of Section 5's requirements as to contents of the
prospectus and timeliness of its delivery.
The plaintiff seeking recovery under Section 12 (1) need only
allege and prove:
1. That the defendant was a seller, or under Section 15 of
the 1933 Act, a person in control of a seller. It appears that a
broker for the seller is a "seller." 10
2. That the mails or some means of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce was involved in the offer or
sale to the particular plaintiff (rather than merely generally
used) ."
3. That the defendant failed to comply with either the
registration or prospectus requirement under Section 5 of the
1933 Act.
4. In the event plaintiff seeks rescission, that adequate
tender was made.
5. That the action is not barred by the statute of limitations
under Section 13.
The defense to succeed would have to rebuff plaintiff in one
of those aspects. For example, the defense would try to show that
10 Cady v. Murphy, 113 F. 2d 988 (1 Cir., 1940) cert. den. 311 U. S. 705.
11 Farrell v. Reynolds, 11 N. Y. Supp. 2d 117 (1939) affd. 258 App. Div.
864, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 530 (1939).
Jan., 1963
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the transaction did not require registration since it was purely
intrastate or constituted a private offering. Intent or knowledge
of the seller would not seem to be a factor in determining
liability where the complaint rests on Section 12 (1).12
Liability Under Section 12(2)
The reach of Section 12(2) is far beyond that of 12 (1).
Section 12(2) provides:
Any person who offers or sells a security (whether or
not exempted by the provisions of section 3, other than
paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or
omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid
for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
The plaintiff seeking recovery under Section 12(2) is re-
quired to allege and prove:
1. That the defendant (s) offered or sold a security, including
a security otherwise exempt by the provisions of Section 3 of
the Act pertaining to exempted securities. All security sales are
within its ambit except governmental securities under Section
3 (a) (2).
2. That the sale was in fact made to this plaintiff.
3. That the mails or some means of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce was involved in the offer or
12 See Peterson Engine Co., Inc., 2 S. E. C. 893, 903 (1937), and Wonneman
v. Stratford Securities Co., U. S. Dist. Ct. (S. D. N. Y.) (1961) No. 140-388.
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sale to the particular plaintiff (rather than merely generally
used). An oral communication can be enough.' 3
4. That the offer was made by means of a prospectus or oral
communication.
5. That such prospectus or oral communication included an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements not misleading
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made.
6. That the purchaser had no knowledge of any such untruth
or omission.
The statutory liability under Section 12 (2) is not limited to
rescission. If the purchaser no longer owns the security he may
recover damages.
As heretofore indicated, in an action under Section 11 the
ordinary buyer will not be entitled to sue the dealer from whom
he purchased since the dealer is not a proper party defendant
under that Section. Therefore, in order to reach the dealer, a
count under Section 12(2) would seem indispensable.1 4
Where the plaintiff sues under Section 12(2) the defendant
may meet the plaintiff on the elements of plaintiff's case, may
defend on limitations where applicable and may defend by show-
ing that the seller did not know of such untruth or omission
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known.
Section 12(2) smacks of common law rescission. While the
similarities and differences are beyond the scope of this paper,
they should be kept in mind.15
13 The use of the mails problem takes on an added dimension under Sec.
12(2) in the case where the misrepresentation is oral and not in commerce
or is made by supplemental advertising literature rather than the prospec-
tus. As to oral misrepresentations, a liberal construction was followed in
Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F. 2d 875, 878 (2 Cir., 1943);
Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F. 2d 690 (5 Cir., 690), cert. dism. 347 U. S. 925
(1954), and MacClain v. Bules, 275 F. 2d 431 (8 Cir., 1960). The Seventh
Circuit has taken the lead in requiring strict proof as to -use of the channels
of interstate commerce. Kemper v. Lohnes, 173 F. 2d 44, 46 (1949). There
apparently are no decisions as yet touching precisely the question of mis-
representation by collateral written instruments. If the term "prospectus" is
properly broadly defined to include all of the offering literature, the plaintiff
has no problem.
14 Cady v. Murphy, supra n. 10.
15 For an excellent comparison of the two see 3 Loss, Securities Regulation,
1702 et seq. (2d ed. 1961).
Jan., 1963
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Liability Under Section 10 of the 1934 Act and Rule X-10B-5
Section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 makes it un-
lawful for any person by use of the instruments of interstate
commerce or any facility of any national securities exchange to
use any manipulative or deceptive device in the purchase or sale
of securities in contravention of the rules of the Commission.
Section 10 was intended as an "anti-fraud" remedy with no
direct intent in the first instance to create a new basis for civil
liability. The Commission promulgated Rule X-10B-5'0 and the
courts soon implied a civil liability for damages 7 from Section
10 (b) and the Rule.
Thus, whereas Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act appear to
create causes of action for the buyer of securities, Section 10 (b)
opened the door for persons wrongfully induced to sell their
securities by the misrepresentations of the buyer.
What is most significant is that most of the courts which have
faced the implied liability doctrine have extended the remedy
to the buyer as well as the seller, so that the buyer is not limited
by the inhibitions' s surrounding remedies under Sections 11
and 12.
The Ninth Circuit in Ellis v. Carter has given most recent
expression to a broad interpretation of Section 10 (b) and Rule
X-10B-5 (2) .19 It has been followed by a Delaware District Court
decision which described Ellis as "particularly persuasive." 20
16 Rule X-10B-5. Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.-
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. (Exch. Act Release 3230, eft. 5/21/42).
17 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E. D. Pa. 1947), 83 F.
Supp. 613 (E. D. Pa. 1947); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783
(2 Cir., 1951); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627 (9 Cir., 1953); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 235 F. 2d 369 (3 Cir., 1956).
The liability created under subparagraphs (1) and (3) of the Rule
is in addition to that for untrue statements or omissions under Rule
X-10B-5(2); that liability is beyond the scope of this commentary.
18 Such as the statute of limitations and security for costs under the 1933
Act, afterwards discussed.
19 291 F. 2d 270 (9 Cir. 1961).
20 Dauphin Corp. v. Redwald Corp., 201 F. Supp. 406 (D. Del., 1962).
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Since this implied liability doctrine is in large measure a
creature of judicial decision and with the development of the law
still incomplete, there is no final certainty at this time in im-
portant areas such as whether the misstatement or omission
must be fraudulent, whether reliance and scienter are essential
elements, whether privity of contract is important, whether the
tests of "commerce" are the same as under the 1933 Act, and
what should be the measure of damages.
2 1
What Constitutes Misstatements and Omissions
For the lawyer pursuing a civil remedy under either the
1933 or 1934 Act it will soon become evident that usually the
easiest part of his journey is proof of the objectionable mis-
statement or omission itself. The statutory language is broad
and interpretations have been liberal. A sampling of the out-
look of the S. E. C. and of court decisions is enough to illus-
trate the point.
Rule 405 as promulgated by the S. E. C. defines "material"
in this fashion:
The term "material" when used to qualify a requirement for
the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the
information required to those matters as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before
purchasing the security registered.
The Commission in In re C. A. Howard had before it a stop
order proceeding, wherein it defined a "material fact" as "a fact
which, if it had been correctly stated, would have deterred or
tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the
securities in question." 22
In an early case interpreting the mail fraud statute, the
Supreme Court indicated that "to promise what one does not
mean to perform or to declare an opinion as to future events
which one does not hold, is a fraud." 23
Unless statements as to prospects for the future are based
21 Cf. Loss, Securities Regulations, op. cit. supra, n. 15, at 1764, et seq. The
same work considers whether under the cases there is not also an implied
right of action under Section 17 of the 1933 Act. As to Section 10(b), see
also 37 A. L. R. 2d 1649.
22 1 S. E. C. 6 (1934).
23 Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306 (1896).
Jan., 1963
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upon proper foundation they also involve misrepresentations of
fact, even though the event has not yet occurred.
24
Valuations of experts, geological reports and similar ex-
pressions of expert opinion are regarded by the Commission as
based on implied representations that appropriate standards have
been met. Not to observe such standards would therefore con-
stitute a misrepresentation of fact.
25
The preparation and use of a pro forma balance sheet which
concealed a deficit incurred by the issuer and which failed to set
forth an important assumption on which it was based constituted
deception of a purchaser since he would not know the true
condition of the issuer and this operated as a fraud in violation
of Section 10 (b) .26
It is misleading to infer in a prospectus that the underwriter
has made a firm commitment when actually it is undertaking
only to act on a "best efforts" basis.
2 7
It was an untrue statement of a material fact where the
seller had indicated that the stock of the issuing company being
sold at $4.50 per share was stock in a "nice little operating com-
pany," that the company was managed and practically controlled
by a New York bank, that the company's earnings were around
30 a share and that the New York bank had refused to sell its
stock because it believed the price would rise to $12.00.28
Neither the monumental credulity of the victim29 nor the
investor's sophistication or independent knowledge30 offer a
refuge to the defendant.
24 Comstock Dexter Mines, Inc., 10 S. E. C. 358, 372 (1941); Alexander Reid
& Co., Inc. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 6727 (1962).
25 Haddam Distillers Corp., 1 S. E. C. 37, 42 (1934); Oklahoma-Texas Trust,
2 S. E. C. 764, 782 (1937), affd. 100 F. 2d 888, 894 (10 Cir., 1939).
26 In re Leedy Wheeler & Co., 16 S. E. C. 299 (1944).
27 Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F. 2d 855 (2 Cir., 1956).
28 Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (S. D. Maine, 1939) affd. (1 Cir., 1940),
113 F. 2d 988, cert. den. 311 U. S. 705 (supra, n. 10).
29 Deaver v. U. S., 155 F. 2d 740, 744-745 (D. C. 1946), cert. den. 329 U. S.
766 (Mail Fraud Statute). Contra: S. E. C. v. Gold Hub Mines Co., 1
S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 634, 635 (1939) (indicating generally that more
"puffing" is to be expected in the case of mining stock than the case of
others.)
30 Leonard Burton Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 5978 (1959).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss1/11
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
Statute of Limitations
The limitations provisions of the 1933 Act are contained in
Section 13.
An action under Section 11 must be commenced within one
year after the discovery of the untruth or omission but not more
than three years after the security involved was offered to the
public in a bona fide offer. A like limitation exists with regard
to actions brought pursuant to Section 12 (2); here, however, the
three-year period commences from the date of the sale of the
security rather than the date of the offer to the public. There
may be inquiry whether plaintiff acted with due diligence in
discovering the untruth or omission.3 '
An action based on Section 12 (1) must be started within one
year after the violation of Section 5 but not more than three
years after the sale of the security. It must be brought within
one year after use of interstate facilities in violation of Section
5.32
The three-year limitation is not alternative to the one-year
period. Rather, the plaintiff must overcome both the one-year
and the three-year limitation provisions. Since the same Act
creating the cause of action also establishes limitations, under
federal law the plaintiff must allege and prove compliance with
Section 13.
33
A determination of the governing statute of limitations
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is more tortuous.
Since the 1934 Act contains no express statute of limitations
applicable to Section 10,3 1 that defense is generally governed
by the law of the state of the forum subject to possible tolling
under a federal doctrine which applies where the plaintiff sues
only in equity and plaintiff was in ignorance of the fraud without
any fault or want of diligence on his part.35
The temptation of a buyer to escape the confines of Section
13 under the 1933 Act is understandable. While there are con-
31 Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F. 2d 855 (2 Cir., 1956).
32 Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S. D. N. Y., 1949).
33 Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F. 2d 818 (3 Cir., 1941).
34 Sec. 29 of the 1934 Act has no application.
35 Holmberg v. Almbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946). Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N. D. Ill. 1952). Query whether
in an action under Sec. 10(b) compliance or not with limitations require-
ments is part of the sword or part of the shield.
Jan., 1963
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trary District Court decisions, a buyer succeeded in Fischman
v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co. 36
Jurisdiction and Procedure
Section 22 (a) of the 1933 Act gives the state and federal
courts concurrent jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by" the
Act.3 7 Jurisdiction is created by the terms of the statute, so that
neither diversity of citizenship nor jurisdictional amount is re-
quired.
Any suit under the 1933 Act may be brought in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place, if
the defendant participated therein. Process in such cases may be
served in any other district in which defendant is an inhabitant
or wherever the defendant may be found. It has just been held
that extra-territorial service of process in an action under the
Exchange Act does not confer jurisdiction over out-of-state de-
fendants with regard to a common law count in the complaint. 38
Section 22 (a) expressly provides that a case properly brought in
a state court may not be removed to a United States District
Court.
Although the defendant may be hard pressed from the stand-
point of jurisdiction and venue, in a proper case he may find
comfort in the transfer provisions of Section 1404 (a) on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. 39 By its terms Section 1404 (a)
applies to "any action, suit or proceedings of a civil nature."
It clearly applies, for example, to anti-trust litigation, 40 and no
reason in logic is seen why it should not apply to the Securities
Acts.
The plaintiff having found a likely forum, may well want
company to lighten the economic load and increase the prize.
He is helped by the applicability of the class action device
authorized by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
36 188 F. 2d 783 (2 Cir., 1951), supra, n. 17. The implied liability doctrine
as it touches Sec. 17 of the 1933 Act may carry with it a similar escape
from the rigors of Sec. 13.
37 See. 27 of the 1934 Act is similar but not identical to Sec. 22 (a). In the
interest of brevity it is not treated separately.
38 1. L. G. W. U. v. Shields & Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y.; Dimock, J.;
31 L. W. 2181 (Sept. 21, 1962).
39 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1404(a).
40 U. S. v. National City Lines, 337 U. S. 78, 69 S. Ct. 955 (1949).
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Assuming that the requirements of Rule 23 are met (such as
common questions of law and fact) the device is available in
actions under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 41 However, the
plaintiff's prospects with the class action device are not unlimited.
The usual action under the Securities Acts is the "spurious"
class action binding only upon the actual parties, intervenors,
and those in privity with the parties plaintiff. A district court
as a matter of discretion has refused the request of plaintiffs in
a spurious class action that the principal defendant be required
to divulge a list of all its stockholders, 42 and that a broker de-
fendant be compelled to list all persons to whom they sold
stock of the corporation as principal. It was asserted without
success there that unless other stockholders were notified
forthwith, the statute of limitations would expire.
Assuming plaintiff succeeds in filing a good complaint
(whether class action or not) the defendant will be waiting with
a procedural hammer. Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act authorizes
a court to require a plaintiff to provide security for costs in-
cluding attorneys' fees. The 1934 Act has similar provisions
but they are directed at situations other than those contemplated
in Section 10 (b) .43 Quite obviously, security for costs, if re-
quired, could break the plaintiff's back.
McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., Inc.44 illustrates how a
plaintiff may successfully "thread the needle" to avoid security
for costs. This was a spurious class action under Rule 23 by the
stockholders of Borne, alleging in part a sale of stock by the
corporation to a third party in fraud and in derogation of their
pre-emptive rights, all in violation of Rule X-10B-5 and Section
29 of the 1934 Act. Plaintiffs expressly averred that they
claimed "no other cause of action in this litigation against these
defendants." Defendants insisted that security for costs was
required by a Pennsylvania state statute, by the general federal
equity law, and by analogy from Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order that no
security for costs was required under the limited relief sought
by plaintiff.
41 Cf. Loss, Securities Regulations, supra, n. 15 at p. 1819 et seq.
42 Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962).
43 Sec. 9(e) of the 1934 Act has reference to manipulation of security prices.
Sec. 18 establishes a liability for false and misleading statements filed with
the S. E. C. in any filing.
44 292 F. 2d 824 (3 Cir., 1961), cert. den. 368 U. S. 939.
Jan., 1963
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